State Ownership and the Evolution of Italian Corporate Governance

Fabrizio Barca and Sandro Trento ()

Industrial and Corporate Change, 1997, vol. 6, issue 3, 533-59

Abstract: State ownership, pyramidal groups, family trust and a minor role for banks and other financial institutions in the corporate governance of both large and small enterprises are the structural features of Italian capitalism today. This paper offers a critical analysis of state ownership by analyzing the evolution of Italian corporate governance since the Second World War. It concludes that full or majority state ownership of corporations can be effective in separating ownership and control during stages of powerfully accelerating growth and when shifts in the sectoral balance are needed; that state-owned enterprises must not be burdened with 'special social objectives'; and that the system is bound to degenerate without a functioning political market to guarantee democratic changes of parties and power if the 'mission' culture of public managers is eroded. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1997
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