CARTEL OVERCHARGES AND THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF EU COMPETITION LAW

Florian Smuda

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2014, vol. 10, issue 1, 63-86

Abstract: This article examines cartel overcharges for the European market. Using a sample of 191 overcharge estimates and several parametric and semiparametric estimation procedures, the impact of different cartel characteristics and the market environment on the magnitude of overcharges is analyzed. The mean and median overcharge rates are found to be 20.70 percent and 18.37 percent of the selling price and the average cartel duration is 8.35 years. Certain cartel characteristics and the geographic region of cartel operation influence the level of overcharges considerably. Furthermore, empirical evidence reveals that from an ex-post perspective the currently existing fine level of the EU Guidelines is insufficient for optimal cartel deterrence, suggesting further adjustments.

JEL-codes: L13 L41 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Cartel overcharges and the deterrent effect of EU competition law (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:10:y:2014:i:1:p:63-86.

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