Cartel overcharges and the deterrent effect of EU competition law

Florian Smuda

No 12-050, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: This paper examines cartel overcharges for the European market. Using a sample of 191 overcharge estimates and several parametric and semi-parametric estimation procedures, the impact of different cartel characteristics and the market environment on the magnitude of overcharges is analyzed. The mean and median overcharge rates are found to be 20.70 percent and 18.37 percent of the selling price and the average cartel duration is 8.35 years. Certain cartel characteristics and the geographic region of cartel operation influence the level of overcharges considerably. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that the currently existing fine level of the EU Guidelines is too low to achieve optimal deterrence.

Keywords: cartels; overcharges; Europe; fines; deterrence; damages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L41 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eur and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: CARTEL OVERCHARGES AND THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF EU COMPETITION LAW (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12050

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