CONCRETE SHOES FOR COMPETITION: THE EFFECT OF THE GERMAN CEMENT CARTEL ON MARKET PRICE

Kai Hüschelrath, Kathrin Müller and Tobias Veith
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kai Hueschelrath

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2013, vol. 9, issue 1, 97-123

Abstract: We use publicly available price data from the German cement industry to estimate the cartel-induced price increase. We apply two different comparator-based approaches—the “before-and-after” approach and the “difference-in-differences” approach—and especially study the impact of various assumptions on the transition period from the cartel period to the non-cartel period on the overcharge estimate. We find that the cement cartel led to price overcharges in a range from 20.3 to 26.5 percent, depending on model approach and model assumptions.

JEL-codes: K21 L41 L61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Concrete shoes for competition: The effect of the German cement cartel on market price (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:9:y:2013:i:1:p:97-123.

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