Concrete shoes for competition: The effect of the German cement cartel on market price

Kai Hüschelrath, Kathrin Müller and Tobias Veith ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kai Hueschelrath

No 12-035, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: We use publicly available price data from the German cement industry to estimate the cartelinduced price increase. We apply two different comparator-based approaches - the 'before and-after' approach and the 'difference-in-differences' approach - and especially study the impact of various assumptions on the transition period from the cartel period to the non-cartel period on the overcharge estimate. We find that the cement cartel led to price overcharges in a range from 20.3 to 26.5 percent depending on model approach and model assumptions.

Keywords: antitrust policy; cartels; private enforcement; damages; overcharge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: CONCRETE SHOES FOR COMPETITION: THE EFFECT OF THE GERMAN CEMENT CARTEL ON MARKET PRICE (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12035

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