Norms Make Preferences Social

Erik Kimbrough and Alexander Vostroknutov

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2016, vol. 14, issue 3, 608-638

Abstract: We explore the idea that prosocial behavior in experimental games is driven by social norms imported into the laboratory. Under this view, differences in behavior across subjects is driven by heterogeneity in sensitivity to social norms. We introduce an incentivized method of eliciting individual norm-sensitivity, and we show how it relates to play in public goods, trust, dictator, and ultimatum games. We show how our observations can be rationalized in a stylized model of norm-dependent preferences under reasonable assumptions about the nature of social norms. Then we directly elicit norms in these games to test the robustness of our interpretation.

JEL-codes: C91 C92 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (165)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jeea.12152 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Journal Article: NORMS MAKE PREFERENCES SOCIAL (2016)
Working Paper: Norms Make Preferences Social (2014)
Working Paper: Norms Make Preferences Social (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:14:y:2016:i:3:p:608-638.

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of the European Economic Association is currently edited by Romain Wacziarg

More articles in Journal of the European Economic Association from European Economic Association
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().