A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements

David Martimort and Wilfried Sand-Zantman

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2016, vol. 14, issue 3, 669-712

Abstract: We take a mechanism design perspective to investigate how environmental agreements should account for multilateral externalities, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation by sovereign countries. The optimal mechanism involves a tradeoff between a free rider problem in the effort provision of participating countries and the necessity of inducing countries to ratify the agreement. This mechanism can be approximated by a simple menu with attractive implementation and robustness properties. Limits on enforcement and commitment might nevertheless hinder the performance of this menu, making the “business as usual” scenario more likely.

JEL-codes: D82 H23 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jeea.12150 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Journal Article: A MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH TO CLIMATE-CHANGE AGREEMENTS (2016)
Working Paper: A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements (2016)
Working Paper: A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:14:y:2016:i:3:p:669-712.

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of the European Economic Association is currently edited by Romain Wacziarg

More articles in Journal of the European Economic Association from European Economic Association
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().