The Dynamics of Climate Agreements

Bard Harstad

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2016, vol. 14, issue 3, 719-752

Abstract: This paper analyzes a framework in which countries over time pollute and invest in green technologies. Without a climate treaty, the countries pollute too much and invest too little, particularly if intellectual property rights are weak. Nevertheless, short-term agreements on emission levels then reduce every country's payoff, since countries invest less when they anticipate future negotiations. If intellectual property rights are weak, the agreement should be tougher and more long-term. Conversely, if the climate agreement happens to be short-term or absent, intellectual property rights should be strengthened or technological licensing subsidized.

JEL-codes: D86 H87 Q54 Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

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Related works:
Journal Article: THE DYNAMICS OF CLIMATE AGREEMENTS (2016)
Working Paper: The Dynamics of Climate Agreements (2010)
Working Paper: The Dynamics of Climate Agreements (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:14:y:2016:i:3:p:719-752.

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