Ordered Consumer Search

Mark Armstrong

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2017, vol. 15, issue 5, 989-1024

Abstract: The paper discusses situations in which consumers search through their options in a deliberate order. Topics include: the existence of ordered search equilibria with symmetric sellers (all consumers first inspect the seller they anticipate will set the lowest price, and a seller that is inspected first by consumers will set the lowest price); the use of price and non-price advertising to direct search; how purchase history can guide future search; and the incentive a seller can have to raise its own search cost. I also show how ordered search can be reformulated as a simpler discrete choice problem without search frictions.

JEL-codes: D21 D43 D83 L11 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (62)

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Working Paper: Ordered Consumer Search (2016)
Working Paper: Ordered Consumer Search (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:15:y:2017:i:5:p:989-1024.

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