Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters

Filip Matejka and Guido Tabellini

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2021, vol. 19, issue 3, 1899-1935

Abstract: This paper studies how voters’ selective ignorance interacts with policy design by political candidates. It shows that the selectivity empowers voters with extreme preferences and small groups, that divisive issues attract most attention, and that public goods are underfunded. Finer granularity of information increases these inefficiencies. Rational inattention can also explain why competing opportunistic candidates do not always converge on the same policy issues.

Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters (2016)
Working Paper: Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters (2015)
Working Paper: Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters (2015)
Working Paper: Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:19:y:2021:i:3:p:1899-1935.

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