Regulatory Interventions in Consumer Financial Markets: The Case of Credit Cards

Manolis Galenianos and Alessandro Gavazza

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2022, vol. 20, issue 5, 1897-1932

Abstract: We build a framework to understand the effects of regulatory interventions in credit markets, such as caps on interest rates. We focus on the credit card market, in which we observe US consumers borrowing at high and very dispersed interest rates despite receiving many credit card offers. Our framework includes two main features to account for these patterns: the endogenous effort of examining offers and product differentiation. Our calibration suggests that most borrowers examine few of the offers they receive, and thereby forego cards with low interest rates and high non-price benefits. The calibrated model implies that interest-rate caps reduce credit supply and significantly curb lenders’ market power, thereby increasing consumer surplus. Moderate caps may yield larger gains in consumer surplus than tighter ones.

Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Regulatory interventions in consumer financial markets: the case of credit cards (2022)
Working Paper: Regulatory Interventions in Consumer Financial Markets: The Case of Credit Cards (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:20:y:2022:i:5:p:1897-1932.

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