Public Versus Secret Voting in Committees

Andrea Mattozzi and Marcos Y Nakaguma

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2023, vol. 21, issue 3, 907-940

Abstract: We study the effect of transparency of individual votes in committees where members are heterogeneous in competence and bias, they are career-concerned, and they can abstain. We show that public voting attenuates the biases of competent members and secret voting attenuates the biases of incompetent members. Public voting leads to better decisions when the magnitude of the bias is large, while secret voting performs better otherwise. We present novel experimental evidence consistent with our theory.

Date: 2023
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Related works:
Working Paper: Public versus Secret Voting in Committees (2022)
Working Paper: Public versus Secret Voting in Committees (2017)
Working Paper: Public versus Secret Voting in Committees (2016)
Working Paper: Public versus Secret Voting in Committees (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:21:y:2023:i:3:p:907-940.

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