Structural Reforms and Elections: Evidence from a World-Wide New Dataset

Alberto Alesina, Davide Furceri, Jonathan Ostry, Chris Papageorgiou () and Dennis P Quinn

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2024, vol. 22, issue 4, 1936-1980

Abstract: We present two new databases we have constructed to explore the electoral consequences of structural economic policy reforms. One database measures reforms in domestic finance, external finance, trade, product, and labor markets covering 90 advanced and developing economies from 1973 to 2014. The other chronicles the timing and results of national elections. We find that liberalizing reforms are associated with economic benefits that accrue only gradually over time. Because of this delay, liberalizing reforms are costly to democratic incumbents when they are implemented close to elections. Electoral outcomes also depend on the state of the economy: Reforms are penalized during contractions but are often rewarded in expansions.

Date: 2024
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Related works:
Working Paper: Structural Reforms and Elections: Evidence from a World-Wide New Dataset (2020)
Working Paper: Structural Reforms and Elections: Evidence from a World-Wide New Dataset (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:22:y:2024:i:4:p:1936-1980.

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