 An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United StatesThe Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1995, vol. 11, issue 2, 479-501 Abstract: Findings from historical research show that the "evidence" generally cited to support the contention that arbitration is effective primarily because of the threat of court-imposed sanctions should actually be characterized as "historical assumptions." Arbitration statutes commanding courts to recognize arbitration settlements and arbitration clauses were not the stimulus for the growth of arbitration that they are often assumed to have been. In fact, arbitration backed by nonlegal sanctions was well established long before the passage of arbitration statutes. Furthermore, political demands for these statutes are primarily from bar associations, which saw arbitration without lawyers as a threat to their livelihood. Refutation of the supporting evidence does not necessarily reject the hypothesis that legal sanctions are prerequisites for some arbitration, but nonlegal sanctions clearly provide sufficient backing under many circumstances. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press. Date: 1995 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:479-501 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization is currently edited by Andrea Prat More articles in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. |
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