An Informational Theory of the Legislative Veto

Elizabeth M Martin

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1997, vol. 13, issue 2, 319-43

Abstract: A formal model is analyzed in which a legislature considers giving up some or all of its policy-making authority in order to benefit from the executive's potentially superior information. Delegation may occur while legislators care about the impact of policy, are able to set policy on their own, and may include a procedural constraint--a legislative veto--when they delegate. Congress's continued use of legislative-veto procedures demonstrates the need for a model of delegation including delegation with a procedural constraint. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1997
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