A Comment on "Corruption by Design."

Cemile Yavas

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1998, vol. 14, issue 1, 174-79

Abstract: In an article that appeared in the April 1996 issue of this journal, Melanie Manion analyzed corruption incidence in Chinese enterprise licensing using a multistage game. The model, she concludes, implies that bribery is quite robust and "to move away entirely from the corrupt equilibria... requires very substantial changes in institutional design." Manion models a multistage game with three stages, she solves for the equilibrium in a subgame consisting of the last two stages, but she neglects to check whether this subgame is played in the equilibrium. As a result her conclusion is incorrect. The purpose of this comment is to demonstrate the flaws in Manion's analysis. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:14:y:1998:i:1:p:174-79

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization is currently edited by Andrea Prat

More articles in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().