Partisan and Bipartisan Signaling in Congress

David Epstein

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1998, vol. 14, issue 2, 183-204

Abstract: Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) analyze bipartisanship in committees through a model in which committee ideal points are exactly symmetric about the floor's ideal point. This article has three objectives: it shows that the Gilligan and Krehbiel equilibrium does not generalize to asymmetric committee members; it proves that a similar equilibrium can be supported when the majority party committee member has gatekeeping power; and it compares this equilibrium to the one-signaler case to show that when partisan differences over policy are small, or when the uncertainty associated with a policy area is large, bipartisanship will be preferred to partisan policy making. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1998
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