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Color Blind Is Not Color Neutral: Testing Differences and Affirmative Action

Jean-Pierre Benoit

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1999, vol. 15, issue 2, 378-400

Abstract: Employers or universities determine the qualifications of applicants based on the results of a test. Members of socioeconomically disadvantaged groups tend to score less well than equally qualified members of other groups. As a result, color blind practices discriminate against disadvantaged groups. This discrimination may persist even if rational firms realize that the test is (statistically) biased. Furthermore, test bias against a group is consistent with the test overpredicting group members' performance. An affirmative action program may be needed to achieve color-neutral results. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1999
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