 Information, Civil Liberties, and the Political Economy of Witch-HuntsThe Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1999, vol. 15, issue 2, 503-25 Abstract: Drawing from an extensive literature on the European witch-hunt, McCarthyism, and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, this article studies how differences in the level of civil liberties protection and the extent to which the leader has better information about the level of the alleged menace than the populace, together with other variables, jointly determine the incidence of witch-hunts. I develop a model showing that at any level of civil liberties protection, the incidence of illegitimate witch-hunts is higher when the leader enjoys an informational advantage than when he does not. This difference, however, is decreasing in the level of civil liberties protection. However, no amount of civil liberties protection is sufficient to prevent the occurrence of illegitimate witch-hunts, so long as the citizen has a concern for the menace, and the leader enjoys an informational advantage and finds the benefit from conducting a witch-hunt to be larger than his reputational loss. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press. Date: 1999 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:2:p:503-25 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization is currently edited by Andrea Prat More articles in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. |
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