Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices: Interinstitutional Preference Estimation

Michael Bailey and Kelly H Chang

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2001, vol. 17, issue 2, 477-506

Abstract: A major challenge in testing spatial, interinstitutional models is placing different sets of actors on a common preference scale. We address this challenge by presenting a random effects, panel probit method which we use to estimate the ideal points of presidents, senators, and Supreme Court justices on one scale. These estimates are comparable across time and institutions. We contrast our method with previously used methods and show that our method increases the ability to study interactions among different institutions. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:17:y:2001:i:2:p:477-506

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization is currently edited by Andrea Prat

More articles in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().