Can Latent Groups Influence Policy Decisions? The Case of Telecommunications Policy

Dino Falaschetti

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2003, vol. 19, issue 1, 83-105

Abstract: Electoral constituencies recognize favorable policy outcomes in high-turnout jurisdictions. In this article I evaluate whether underlying institutions might provide a finer explanation of this relationship. To do so I formally examine variation in telecommunications policy across U.S. states. The resulting evidence is consistent with residential customers recognizing more favorable policy when institutions reduce voting's resource cost (measured by registration rules) or increase its nonpecuniary benefit (measured by Perot support). Measures of either force explain significantly more variation in the present data than does a measure of actual participation (i.e., turnout). Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:1:p:83-105

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization is currently edited by Andrea Prat

More articles in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().