The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the Electorate

Edward Glaeser
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Andrei Shleifer

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2005, vol. 21, issue 1, 1-19

Abstract: James Michael Curley, a four-time mayor of Boston, used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary rhetoric to encourage richer citizens to emigrate from Boston, thereby shaping the electorate in his favor. As a consequence, Boston stagnated, but Curley kept winning elections. We present a model of using redistributive politics to shape the electorate, and show that this model yields a number of predictions opposite from the more standard frameworks of political competition, yet consistent with empirical evidence. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2005
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