EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Accuracy Versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures

Claude Fluet ()

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2009, vol. 25, issue 1, 134-156

Abstract: An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The arbiter's ability to remain uninformed as well as sequential testifying makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence. (JEL D82, K41, K42) The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewm046 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures (2007) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:25:y:2009:i:1:p:134-156

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization is currently edited by Pablo T. Spiller

More articles in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().

 
Page updated 2019-11-07
Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:25:y:2009:i:1:p:134-156