A Theory of "Crying Wolf": The Economics of Money Laundering Enforcement
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Elod Takats
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2011, vol. 27, issue 1, 32-78
The article shows how excessive reporting, called "crying wolf", can dilute the information value of reports and how more reports can mean less information. Excessive reporting is investigated by undertaking the first formal analysis of money laundering enforcement. Banks monitor transactions and report suspicious activity to government agencies, which use these reports to identify investigation targets. Banks face fines should they fail to report money laundering. However, excessive fines force banks to report transactions which are less suspicious. The empirical evidence is shown to be consistent with the model's predictions. The model is used to suggest implementable corrective policy measures, such as decreasing fines and introducing reporting fees. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: email@example.com, Oxford University Press.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Working Paper: A Theory of “Crying Wolf”: The Economics of Money Laundering Enforcement (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:27:y::i:1:p:32-78
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization is currently edited by Andrea Prat
More articles in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().