Institutions and Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids

Joseph P. H. Fan, T. J. Wong and Tianyu Zhang

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2013, vol. 29, issue 6, 1217-1252

Abstract: Pyramidal organizational structures are common throughout the world. This article considers an explanation for pyramids built by the state: separating firms from political interference. Although intermediate pyramidal layers insulate managers from a pyramid's top owners and hence induce agency costs, they also minimize political costs of state intervention. All else equal, the optimal division of power between the government and the managers should be the point at which the marginal agency costs are equal to the marginal political costs. Our empirical results, based on hand-collected data for 742 local government-owned Chinese business groups are generally in line with this hypothesis. (JEL: D21, D23, G32, L22, L32, P31). The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2013
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