Do Politicians’ Relatives Get Better Jobs? Evidence from Municipal Elections

Marcel Fafchamps and Julien Labonne

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2017, vol. 33, issue 2, 268-300

Abstract: This paper estimates the impacts of being connected to politicians on occupational choice. Using an administrative dataset collected in 2008–2010 on 20 million individuals in the Philippines, we rely on naming conventions to assess family links to candidates in elections held in 2007 and 2010. We combine a regression discontinuity design to close elections in 2007 with an alternative approach using individuals connected to successful candidates in 2010 as control group. This allows us to net out the possible cost associated with being related to a losing candidate. We find robust evidence that relatives of current office-holders are more likely to be employed in better paying occupations (JEL D13, D72, J24, P16).

JEL-codes: D13 D72 J24 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Working Paper: Do Politicians' Relatives Get Better Jobs? Evidence from Municipal Elections (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:33:y:2017:i:2:p:268-300.

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