Corruption and Sensitive Soccer Games: Cross-Country Evidence

Guy Elaad, Alex Krumer and Jeffrey Kantor

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2018, vol. 34, issue 3, 364-394

Abstract: We utilize data from sensitive soccer games in 75 countries between the years 2001 and 2013. In these games one team was in immediate danger of relegation to a lower division (Team A) and another team was not affected by the result (Team B). Using within-country variation, our difference-in-difference analysis reveals that the more corrupt the country, according to Corruption Perceptions Index, the higher is the probability that Team A would achieve the desired result in the sensitive games relative to achieving this result in other, non-sensitive games against the same team. We also find that in the later stages of the following year, the probability that Team A would lose against Team B compared to losing against a similar team (usually better than Team B) is significantly higher in more corrupt countries than in less corrupt countries. This result serves as evidence of quid pro quo behavior.

JEL-codes: A12 C93 D73 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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