Self-Selection into Corrupt Judiciaries

Jordan Gans-Morse

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2022, vol. 38, issue 2, 386-421

Abstract: Drawing on experimental games and a survey conducted with university students at an elite legal academy in Ukraine, this study compares the behavioral, attitudinal, and demographic traits of students aspiring to public sector legal careers as judges, prosecutors, and investigators with their counterparts aiming to pursue private sector legal careers as defense attorneys and commercial lawyers. I find evidence that students pursuing public sector legal careers display more willingness to cheat or bribe in experimental games as well as lower levels of altruism. These findings indicate that corruption in some societies may persist in part from the self-selection into government institutions of citizens with a higher propensity to seek profit from illicit activities. Moreover, the findings suggest that such corrupt self-selection can infect a country’s judicial and law enforcement apparatus, with potentially dire implications for the rule of law.

JEL-codes: D73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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