Doing It by the Book: Political Contestability and Public Contract Renegotiations
Jean Beuve,
Marian Moszoro and
Pablo Spiller
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2023, vol. 39, issue 1, 281-308
Abstract:
We present a public procurement model in which contractual flexibility and political tolerance for contractual deviations determine renegotiations. In the model, contractual flexibility allows for adaptation without formal renegotiation, while political tolerance for deviations decreases with political competition. We then compare renegotiation rates of procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find robust evidence consistent with the model predictions: public-to-private contracts are renegotiated more often than comparable private-to-private contracts, and that this pattern is more salient in politically contestable jurisdictions. The frequent renegotiation of public contracts results from their inherent rigidity and provides a relational quality of adaptability to contingencies in politically contestable environments. (JEL D23, D72, D73, D78, H57).
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewab039 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
Working Paper: Doing It by the Book: Political Contestability and Public Contract Renegotiations (2023) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:39:y:2023:i:1:p:281-308.
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals
Access Statistics for this article
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization is currently edited by Andrea Prat
More articles in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().