Does corruption hinder female political participation? Evidence from a measure against organized crime

Anna Laura Baraldi and Carla Ronza ()

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2024, vol. 40, issue 1, 224-265

Abstract: This article analyzes the effect of anti-corruption measures on female political empowerment. We exploit a measure that prescribes the dissolution of city councils for mafia infiltration, leading to an exogenous decrease in the level of corruption within local government. We find that the percentage of female councilors and aldermen elected after compulsory administrations, as well as the probability of a female mayor, sharply increases relative to the control group; the effect of the measure is decreasing over time. The evidence suggests that the most likely mechanism mediating the result relies on the reduction in the voter bias against women as policymakers rather than the (self-)selection of women (JEL D72, D78, J16, J71, I38).

Date: 2024
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