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Partisanship, expertise, or connections? A conjoint survey experiment on lobbyist hiring decisions

David R Miller, Joshua McCrain, Hans J G Hassell and Benjamin C K Egerod

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2025, vol. 41, issue 3, 1025-1044

Abstract: Lobbyists are important agents of organized interests. While prior studies have investigated the observed hiring patterns of interest groups, conclusions about the demand for lobbyist characteristics may be confounded by the availability of lobbyists with certain characteristics. To assess the demand for lobbyists with expertise, connections, and who share groups’ preferences, we use a conjoint survey experiment to examine the hiring preferences for lobbyists. We find that organized interests prefer lobbyists with policy-specific expertise and the necessary connections to get access to decision-makers, but find little evidence that connections are more valuable than expertise. We also find that organized interests prefer lobbyists who share their political ideology, but that this preference diminishes when the hiring organization is not aligned ideologically with the party in unified control of government. Overall, our study paints a more nuanced picture of the role of preferences and connections in lobbying than many would expect.

Date: 2025
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