Policymaking under Influence

Benjamin Blumenthal

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2026, vol. 42, issue 1, 129-158

Abstract: Policymaking is an arduous process and politicians often fail to change the status quo despite their best efforts. I introduce the notion of influence players, an umbrella term for political actors such as interest groups or legislators, who can positively or negatively affect policy proposals’ odds of implementation by exerting costly effort. Analyzing a parsimonious model of policymaking with an imperfectly effective politician and an influence player, I show how and when threats, opposition, or support can affect policymaking, depending on the influence player’s cost of effort and effectiveness. My comparative static analysis shows that, under certain conditions, influence players can be harmed by being more effective or having a lower cost of effort, through these changes’ consequences on their bargaining position. I conclude my analysis by discussing the perspectives the model offers on legislative politics and special interest politics.

Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewaf001 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:42:y:2026:i:1:p:129-158.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization is currently edited by Andrea Prat

More articles in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().