Sliding Scales and Conciliation Boards: Risk-Sharing in the Late 19th Century British Coal Industry

John G Treble

Oxford Economic Papers, 1987, vol. 39, issue 4, 679-98

Abstract: A measure of the extent to which exogenous risk is passed on by a firm to its workers is developed and applied to data derived from two wage-payment regimes in late nineteenth-century Britain. It is f ound that, despite superficial similarities between the two regimes, the conciliation boards provided workers with a substantial degree of insurance against the effect of fluctuations in the output market in the sense that the wage rate was effectively fixed. Copyright 1987 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1987
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