Regret and Jubilation in Union Wage Bargaining

Michael Beenstock ()

Oxford Economic Papers, 1988, vol. 40, issue 2, 296-301

Abstract: On the whole, union bargaining models have been constructed out of utilitarian axioms. This paper explores the implications of a more general utility function according to which individuals rejoice over successful outcomes and regret unfavorable ones. Under certain circumstances, this gives rise to a series of wage rounds in which current wages depend on past wages. The model also suggests an asymme try in which benign shocks raise wages rather than employment, while adverse shocks raise unemployment rather than lower wages. Copyright 1988 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1988
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