The Nature of Rational Choice and The Foundations of Statistics
Oxford Economic Papers, 1991, vol. 43, issue 2, 199-216
This paper addresses the claim that L. J. Savage's account of subjective utility theory models beliefs for all rational agents. Proposals for a two-dimensional model of belief are discussed and sources of criticism of subjective utility theory as a theory of rational choice are categorized. A theory of rational choice is proposed that gives conditions under which choices (including those made by "uncertainty" averters) can be judged to be rational. The paper corroborates A. K. Sen's findings, which show that rationality is not a behavioral entity. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-7653%2819910 ... 0.CO%3B2-W&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:43:y:1991:i:2:p:199-216
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Oxford Economic Papers is currently edited by James Forder and Francis J. Teal
More articles in Oxford Economic Papers from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().