Pre-strike Ballots and Wage-Employment Bargaining

Alan Manning

Oxford Economic Papers, 1993, vol. 45, issue 3, 422-39

Abstract: This paper attempts to construct a model of the economic effects of the introduction of prestrike ballots in the Employment Act (1984). It argues that strike ballots tend to reduce union influence over issues that affect different workers in different ways (like plant closures) and will do little to alter union influence over issues that affect workers similarly (like wages). The effect is that compulsory ballots may reduce employment and do little to reduce wages. The robustness of this result is explored in a number of models. An alternative legal framework is also suggested. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1993
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Working Paper: Pre-Strike Ballots and Wage-Employment Bargaining (1991)
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