Property Rights and Tropical Deforestation

Robert Mendelsohn

Oxford Economic Papers, 1994, vol. 46, issue 0, 750-56

Abstract: This paper presents two formal models that link poorly defined property rights with wasteful deforestation. The first model demonstrates that, when property rights must be privately defended, most of the potential rental value of the land will be dissipated. The second model shows that even small probabilities of eviction will encourage squatters to destroy long-lasting capital (such as forests) and follow unsustainable activities. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1994
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