Global Tradeable Carbon Permits, Participation Incentives, and Transfers

Bjorn Larsen and Anwar Shah

Oxford Economic Papers, 1994, vol. 46, issue 0, 841-56

Abstract: This paper evaluates alternative global tradeable permit allocations to stabilize world Carbon emissions at 1987 levels by 2000. An important group of countries would have little incentive to participate in a treaty based on widely discussed permit allocation principles. Each non-OECD country should be allocated permits equivalent to its projected baseline emissions and OECD countries should be allocated the remaining permits given the world emissions target. Under the proposed regime, the authors find that OECD costs would be about 50 percent lower than unilateral reduction; non-OECD countries will enjoy substantial gains; and world costs will be about 68 percent lower. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1994
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