Rational Dynamic Choice and Expected Utility Theory

Robin Cubitt

Oxford Economic Papers, 1996, vol. 48, issue 1, 1-19

Abstract: This paper considers the normative status of the independence and ordering principles of expected utility theory. Preferences are defined in terms of choice and the two principles derived from restrictions on choice in sequential decision problems. The results extend and clarify important contributions by P. J. Hammond and E. F. McClennen. They show that it is different requirements on dynamic choice which rationalize independence and ordering respectively and illuminate their relationship to consequentialism. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-7653%2819960 ... 0.CO%3B2-H&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:48:y:1996:i:1:p:1-19

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Oxford Economic Papers is currently edited by James Forder and Francis J. Teal

More articles in Oxford Economic Papers from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().