On the Assessment and Implementation of 'Institutional' Remedies

James Forder

Oxford Economic Papers, 1996, vol. 48, issue 1, 39-51

Abstract: The most common approach to testing for the benefits of central-bank independence is argued to be methodologically flawed for the reason that the measure of independence does not permit a test of the hypothesis which suggests that these benefits exist. Particular doubt is cast on the merits of proposals to legislate to create independence. The argument is elucidated by comparison with the testing of a hypothesis about the benefits of centralized and decentralized unions. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (53)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-7653%2819960 ... 0.CO%3B2-E&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:48:y:1996:i:1:p:39-51

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Oxford Economic Papers is currently edited by James Forder and Francis J. Teal

More articles in Oxford Economic Papers from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().