Economics at your fingertips  

Monetary Policy Games and Coalitions in a Two-Country Model with Unionised Wage Setting

Athina Zervoyianni ()

Oxford Economic Papers, 1997, vol. 49, issue 1, 57-76

Abstract: The authors show that, in interdependent unionized economies, cooperation between wage-setters at home and abroad improves both their own positions and social welfare relative to universal Nash play. Moreover, a move from all-around Nash play to cooperation between home and foreign unions and between home and foreign policymakers may produce Pareto improvements or outcomes that are preferable to Nash play for the coalition as a whole. However, intranational coalitions may lack the support of unions. Such coalitions unambiguously improve the policymakers' position. However, in an interdependent world, they do not necessarily make the unions better-off relative to other regimes. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) ... 0.CO%3B2-1&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

Oxford Economic Papers is currently edited by A. Banerjee

More articles in Oxford Economic Papers from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().

Page updated 2019-11-07
Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:49:y:1997:i:1:p:57-76