International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty

Seong-lin Na and Hyun Song Shin

Oxford Economic Papers, 1998, vol. 50, issue 2, 173-85

Abstract: Negotiations toward international environmental agreements take place under uncertainty. The authors address the process of coalition formation in this context. Coalitions are more likely to form among countries that are similar. Since countries are more likely to be facing similar conditions ex ante rather than ex post (i.e., before the resolution of uncertainty rather than after it), the possibility of coalition formation is enhanced the sooner the negotiations take place. The social value of better scientific information may well be negative in such circumstances. Copyright 1998 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1998
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