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Professional Autonomy and the Cost of Legal Aid

Alastair Gray (), Neil Rickman and Paul Fenn

Oxford Economic Papers, 1999, vol. 51, issue 3, 545-58

Abstract: This paper considers whether lawyers, acting as agents, respond to financial incentives which are extraneous to their clients' requirements. The authors take, as a case study, lawyers performing legal aid work in England and Wales. An empirical model of legal aid expenditure variations across areas in relation to changes in the demand for conveyancing services and the structure of the industry is estimated using dynamic panel data methods. The results may help to explain rising government legal aid expenditure in recent years. Copyright 1999 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1999
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