On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Antonio Ciccone and James Costain

Oxford Economic Papers, 2004, vol. 56, issue 4, 701-713

Abstract: Recent papers involving binary choices have argued that increasing heterogeneity decreases positive feedback. We show that no such result holds in models where all agents make interior choices. The results in the binary choice case arise for two reasons. First, if we increase heterogeneity without limit but impose a bounded choice set, then almost all players eventually become completely unresponsive, preferring some corner so strongly that they do not react to any feasible change in the behavior of others. Second, discrete choice permits the construction of strong, but fragile, positive feedbacks through composition effects. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpf061 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:56:y:2004:i:4:p:701-713

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Oxford Economic Papers is currently edited by James Forder and Francis J. Teal

More articles in Oxford Economic Papers from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().