Optimal capital taxation in economies with unionized and competitive labour markets
Erkki Koskela and
Ronnie Schöb
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ronnie Schoeb
Oxford Economic Papers, 2005, vol. 57, issue 4, 717-731
Abstract:
According to the existing literature, capital taxes should not be imposed in the presence of optimal profit taxation in either unionized or competitive labour markets. We show that this conclusion does not hold for economies with dual labour markets where the competitive wage rate provides the outside option for unionized workers. Even with non-distortionary profit taxation, it is optimal for such economies to tax capital if the revenue share of capital in the unionized sector is lower than in the competitive sector. This is because taxing capital income reduces employment and lowers the outside option of workers in the unionized sector, with the latter employment effect being stronger. A capital subsidy should be granted if the opposite relationship of the revenue shares of capital holds. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpi039 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Capital Taxation in Economies with Unionised and Competitive Labour Markets (2002) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:57:y:2005:i:4:p:717-731
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals
Access Statistics for this article
Oxford Economic Papers is currently edited by James Forder and Francis J. Teal
More articles in Oxford Economic Papers from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().