Comment on ‘Market discipline and monetary policy’ by Carl Walsh

Mauricio S. Bugarin and Fabia Carvalho ()

Oxford Economic Papers, 2005, vol. 57, issue 4, 732-739

Abstract: This paper shows that the results Walsh (2000, Market discipline and monetary policy, Oxford Economic Papers, 52, 249--71) obtains are highly sensitive to the assumption that different wage contracts are based on different information sets even though they are negotiated simultaneously. In particular, the power of future expectations to discipline an opportunistic central banker is much weaker when homogeneous information sets are used. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2005
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