The political economy of financial development

Sourafel Girma and Anja Shortland ()

Oxford Economic Papers, 2008, vol. 60, issue 4, 567-596

Abstract: Political economy theories of financial development argue that in countries where a narrow elite controls political decisions, financial development may be obstructed to deny access to finance to potential competitors. We use panel data on developed and developing countries from 1975-2000 to examine the effect of a country's democracy characteristics and regime change on financial development. Our results show that regime stability and democracy promote financial development, with additional benefits from fully democratic regimes. Copyright 2008 , Oxford University Press.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: The Political Economy of Financial Development (2004)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Financial Development (2004)
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