Monopolistic unions, Brainard uncertainty, and optimal monetary policy

Timo Henckel ()

Oxford Economic Papers, 2010, vol. 62, issue 2, 307-322

Abstract: Some authors have argued that multiplicative uncertainty may benefit society as the cautionary motive reduces the inflation bias. However, when there are non-atomistic wage setters, higher multiplicative uncertainty may raise the wage premium and unemployment and thus reduce welfare. Furthermore, since central bank preferences also affect the wage premium, delegating policy to an independent central banker with an optimal degree of conservatism cannot deliver a second-best outcome. Copyright 2010 , Oxford University Press.

Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpp011 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: MONOPOLISTIC UNIONS, BRAINARD UNCERTAINTY, AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:62:y:2010:i:2:p:307-322

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Oxford Economic Papers is currently edited by James Forder and Francis J. Teal

More articles in Oxford Economic Papers from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().