Helping others or helping oneself? International subsidies and the provision of global public goods
Ramses Abul Naga and
Philip Jones
Oxford Economic Papers, 2013, vol. 65, issue 4, 856-875
Abstract:
This paper explores the welfare effects of international subsidies designed to expedite the production of global public goods. It distinguishes between the impact subsidies exert on behaviour and the impact subsidies exert on welfare. Subsidies that encourage recipients to contribute to the provision of global public goods can be designed to maximize the welfare of donor countries. While these optimal subsidies achieve a Pareto efficient allocation of resources, all the efficiency gains are appropriated by donor countries. If equity is irrelevant, optimal subsidies are higher for high-income recipients than for low-income recipients. Copyright 2013 Oxford University Press 2012 All rights reserved, Oxford University Press.
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gps044 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:65:y:2013:i:4:p:856-875
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals
Access Statistics for this article
Oxford Economic Papers is currently edited by James Forder and Francis J. Teal
More articles in Oxford Economic Papers from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().