Announcements as an equilibrium selection device

Nicola Acocella (), Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (), Andrew Hughes Hallett and Paolo Giovanni Piacquadio

Oxford Economic Papers, 2014, vol. 66, issue 1, 325-347

Abstract: We address the coordination failures that arise in models with multiple equilibria and study how they may be resolved by reconsidering the role of cheap talk communication as an equilibrium selection device. We introduce an outside option (representing common-knowledge expected outcomes in the absence of coordination), and show that a player may be forced to make an announcement leading to a sub-optimal outcome with respect to the commitment solution (a binding message) in order to keep the message credible. The main contribution is to show, by means of examples taken from standard macro- and microeconomic decision making problems, how the existing tools of bargaining can be applied to models with multiple equilibria to produce sensible outcomes. The purpose is to provide a formal underpinning for methods that resolve multiple equilibrium problems by exploiting the power of policy announcements. Copyright 2014 Oxford University Press 2013 All rights reserved, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpt002 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:66:y:2014:i:1:p:325-347

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Oxford Economic Papers is currently edited by James Forder and Francis J. Teal

More articles in Oxford Economic Papers from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().